the 21 st century. JV2010 introduces several new operational concepts such as "dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics." A full consideration of these concepts is beyond the scope of this paper, but successful implementation of these concepts depends on one commodity -information superiority.
JV2010 defines information superiority as "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." 3 [
Impacts on Operational Art "
Since the dawn of organized warfare military history has been written with the human element foremost in the mind of the author. While historians do not neglect the effects of weapons, technology, logistics, doctrine or tactics, in the main military history has been about the soldiers and sailors who fought the great battles. Today, we are witnessing a headlong rush to embrace a "new" kind of warfare -a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). Advocates of this new kind of warfare emphasize that the primacy of the human element will be reduced as sensors, precision guided weapons and information become the sine qua non for combat success.
Information Superiority Warfare-The Intersection of Operational Art and "Jointness"
This new kind of warfare will be fought by smaller units. Indeed, one analyst sees the death of the Army's heavy divisions as they become no more than a command and control structure directing a group of reinforced forward detachments. 4 But, where small units have historically had a narrow view of the totality of the action going on around them, this new 
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warfare will bestow a wider vision of battlefield action. When information was once limited, the side that possessed more, and as importantly, more reliable information was the side that had a significant advantage. JV2010 assumes that perfect knowledge, or "dominant battlespace awareness," will be the normal operating environment for the 21 st century
American military. In this milieu, smaller and smaller units become increasingly more capable because they have an exact picture of the battlefield. On the battlefield of the future the modern leader will also see the battlefield with a greater depth than before. But JV2010
posits that the control of information will be such a decisive factor that it has the potential to rearrange the geometry of warfare, and it acknowledges as much:
"The combination of these technology trends will provide an order of magnitude improvement in lethality. Commanders will be able to attack targets successfully with fewer platforms and less ordnance while achieving objectives more rapidly and with reduced risk. 
Information and Context

We did not need more information at Pearl Harbor, and it is doubtful that we will need more information in the future. What we will need in the next century is a deeper understanding of the political context of war and the very different set of assumptions that our opponents may bring to it. "' 3
The problem with relying on information, and training one's subordinates to "trust the icon," is there is no room left for a deeper understanding not only of war in general, but the historical precursors of the battle in which one currently finds oneself. More information is not always better if there is no context in which to place it. Wayne Sweitzer points out that:
"Historically, the Clausewitzian 'fog of war' has been associated with a lack of available information. Today, this naturally occurring 'battlespace fog' is being exacerbated by too much information." [emphasis in original] 14
In other words, the fog of war has now merely changed to a different set of obstructions -not eliminated, as some have claimed information superiority could bring about. 
6-•
Increase the effects of weapons -By providing "perfect" battlespace awareness, information superiority will allow units to mass quickly, avoid enemy strength and disperse quickly.
• Overwhelm leaders with information -The large volume of information soon to be available to the commander risks inhibiting quick, decisive action in favor of waiting for yet more information that will allow the "perfect" decision.
• Push the operational level of war to lower command echelons -By making smaller units more capable information superiority can make operational leaders from leaders whose view of the battlefield had heretofore remained in the tactical realm.
• Kill subordinate initiative by allowing (although not encouraging) senior leaders to control combat at lower at lower levels.
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But again without context, information superiority is a case of the dog who chases cars every day -what does he do when he finally catches one?
It seems here that the potential effects of information superiority might be offset by the characteristics of operational leadership. A broad vision, for example, would tend to counter the problem of the vast volume of information that would flood those leaders. A broad vision gives the commander a feel for what is truly important in the "big picture" and gives the ability to cast off "nice to know" details. Another component for operational leadership, decentralized execution, gives the commander the ability to issue broad guidance and move on to the next challenge, secure in the knowledge that subordinates are exercising their own initiative. (That commander is secure, of course, only if he/she has enough experience in issuing broad guidance and having it followed -a challenge only overcome through training and experience.) The problem for leader training of the future is how to overcome negative effects of information superiority while retaining the benefits of improved battlespace awareness.
14 Wayne F. Sweitzer, "Battlespace Information, Command and Control (C2), Operational Intelligence and Systems Integration," United States Naval War College NWC 2127A, September 1997, 3. 15 For an excellent discussion of this trend see Robert L. Bateman, "Force XXI and the Death ofAuftragstaktik" Armor, Jan-Feb 1996, 13-15. In the modern history of the U.S. defense establishment there have always been competing strains in defense policy. These are the technological and the traditional.
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The Historical Background
Another subtext of defense policy is the "last war" syndrome. 17 The technological strain emphasizes an approach to warfare driven by modernization -more and better hardware -as the solution to defense preparedness. The traditional approach does not eschew technology but cautions against an overreliance on untried weapons systems and instead places its faith in the human element. The last war syndrome effects both currents of thought. In this theme the danger is not so much that the military intentionally prepares to fight its last war again, but rather that the experience of the last war tends to color key decisions on policies in an interwar period. These two tendencies operate like a pendulum. Today, the ascendance of the technological strain coupled with a "last war syndrome" approach threatens to negate the lessons of history. How did we get here?
Williamson Murray summarizes what happened recently to push us toward a technological orientation where the importance of human factors are minimized: When you look at areas such as information warfare, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and command and control, you see a system of systems coming together that will allow us to dominate battlefield awareness for years to comc.And while some people say there will always be a 'fog of war', I know quite a lot about these programs.
The emerging system of systems promises the capacity to use military force without the same risks as before -it suggests we will dissipate the 'fog of war.'
Owens is not alone; his views represent a major trend in the culture of the American military. The challenge for the training system that will prepare the leader of the future is to decide where the line is between training to use the new technology and training to use the lessons of the past. Historically, the preference is for the former.
The Shape of Training
Discussions of the training for the future war tend to revolve around the "how" of training. The treatment of future training revolves around distance learning, simulations, "virtual" training for individual soldiers and increases in joint exercises. With the exception of joint exercises, this is a "hardware" driven approach in that it is preoccupied with the technology that will deliver the training. Almost never does one encounter discussions of the "what" of training. In the literature one finds few discussions of what leaders will need to know in order to cope with the changes wrought by new technologies or what subjects of instruction are most likely to impart the needed qualities. When discussing operational leadership, the literature is clear when discussing what leaders need, but less definitive when discussing how to structure a training system that imparts those needed qualities. The CFJO is typical of the genre:
"Our education and training systems must prepare joint warriors to meet the challenges that JV2010 envisions. Joint professional military education (JPME) programs must provide our warfighters with an understanding of the strategic concepts that underlie operations."
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If anyone missed the implications of that last sentence, CFJO makes it clear when it later states "Even junior leaders must understand that tactical actions can often have strategic consequences." 22 The problem remains how to instill that kind of awareness.
Military leaders of the future will also need mental agility and a broad vision in order to integrate the vast amount of battlefield information soon to be available to them. The sheer avalanche of data potentially available to future commanders combined with the accelerated pace of operations may be a problem.
"Information processing system capabilities can cause data overload...[nevertheless, individual judgment is a uniquely human trait that even the most sophisticated support systems cannot replace. The key is to consciously and systematically develop, using new, properly focused training and education approaches, the human ability to exercise correct judgments in a rapidly changing digitized environment covering a widely dispersed battlespace."
23
There seems to be an antipathy in the American military to looking to the past for answers. If, as Admiral Joseph Prueher says, "intelligence is the ability to make sense of the information you have," then the one thing the American military has is a history. 24 The preparation for the types of future environments envisioned by JV2010, CFJO and other analysts must begin with a deep background; and that background is gained first in the study of history and followed by the study of operational art.
Where are We?
In what that training will be. It is similarly ambiguous on how we will achieve the mental agility required of future leaders.
"From deliberate and intensive processes involving institutional, on-the-job, and self-study methods, the men and women of our Armed Forces gain the skills, knowledge, and attitudes required to accomplish their required tasks across the range of military operations."
27
It seems that JV2010 and CFJO place a high emphasis on self-study and on-the-job training at the expense of more formal, guided study. This may not be adequate to gain a deep appreciation of operational art.
c "-. Conclusions
•
Military leaders of the future will be faced with a wide array of possible modes of operation, from domestic assistance to conventional war, all of which they must be prepared to execute. These possibilities demand a mental agility that will enable those leaders to shift seamlessly from one mode to the other. Perhaps this is even more important now as the specter of major conventional war diminishes but as other threats to U.S. national interests grow. It is curious to note that even as the U.S. fully embraces its "revolution in military affairs" with its emphasis on technology not history, our potential adversaries are looking to history for the answers. A.J. Bacevich notes that:
"By jettisoning the established conventions governing armed conflict, [we] move into murky terrain: people's war, subversion, terror, and banditry. In truth, the past is rich with examples that testify to the efficacy of such methods. The brief Cold-War history of the post-Cold War era...suggests that the continuing relevance of those examples has not been lost on those who reject America's view of how the world should work."
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Bacevich continues in a vein that suggest that operational art and military history are used by our adversaries who may be undergoing their own RMA, whether or not they understand it, and whether or not they hold degrees in military art and science:
"Unhampered by the squeamishness or scruples of our own post-Clausewitzian elites, these neo-Clausewitzians are eager to subvert the status quo, adopting selected new technologies that make it possible for ever smaller groups of perpetrators to inflict ever more mayhem."
30
This seems to suggest that if our enemies are using the lessons of Clausewitz, perhaps we should not be too eager to cast him aside. We will need to restructure our officer education system, and perhaps our noncommissioned officer education system, in order to impart the skills that confer the characteristics of operational leadership. If JV2010 envisions an increase in capability of smaller units, it is not an intellectual stretch to assume that a brigade commander could soon find himself with the "punch" previously only within the realm of a corps commander.
(Could not company commanders soon find themselves with the firepower and capability of the brigade commanders of today?)
We must create the mental agility in leaders which enables them to differentiate between when the electronic information "feels" right and when it does not. We must give them mental tools to overcome "data smog" and its tendency to overwhelm leaders with both Nowhere is this more important than in the combat arms of the Army and Marines.
Second, the study of military history should be vastly expanded and pushed into precommissioning programs. Currently, instruction in military history in pre-commissioning programs is minimal. The background that will allow officers to grasp the finer points of 32 Author's personal notes. This remark was overheard during a Congressional conference on the FY1997 Defense Authorization Bill, in March 1996. Source is unknown.
operational art is in military history. There will be no time to offer more than supplementary readings once an officer is commissioned since he/she will then have to begin the study of operational art in earnest. This background must come "up front," prior to commissioning.
This program should then continue through junior officer and field grade ranks using the "institutional, on-the-job, and self-study methods" prescribed by JV2010.
Finally, our non-commissioned officer corps should be brought on board by deepening their study of military history both in a formal and an informal manner. Since Given the uncertainty of the future battlefield and the types of conflicts in which the American military is likely to be involved, this is the very least the military education system can do to ensure success.
33 Bruce B.G. Clarke, "Leadership on the Digital Battlefield," Armor, Jul-Aug 1996, 13.
